# Arcus Exploit, November 2026: What Happened to the $2.2M and What Users Should Check

> On November 9, 2026 one account used an Arcus sub-account bug to withdraw $2,234,391 USDG. What Arcus confirmed, what is still unknown, and what to check.

*Source: https://arcusguide.com/privacy/arcus-exploit-november-2026*

On the night of November 9, 2026 (US Eastern time), a single newly created Arcus account used an accounting bug to withdraw **2,234,391 USDG** it was not entitled to. Arcus paused withdrawals, deployed a fix, and says it covered the full shortfall from the Arcus Labs treasury. It also says no other user's balance, position or order was affected.


> **Key takeaway:** **The short version, from Arcus's [incident report](https://arcus.xyz/blog/arcus-incident-report-november-9-2026) (November 10, 2026):** one account withdrew $2,234,391 in USDG through a bug in transfers between a user's own sub-accounts. Arcus says the shortfall is covered and other accounts were untouched. You can check your own balance on the Portfolio page at app.arcus.xyz and your wallet's transfers on the Robinhood Chain explorer. Official updates come from arcus.xyz, status.arcus.xyz and @arcus_xyz.



![Arcus's incident report of November 10, 2026: the summary, what happened, the impact list ($2,234,391 USDG withdrawn, $3M held by the bridge rate limit and reversed) and the response timeline in Eastern time](/images/privacy/arcus-exploit-november-2026/arcus-incident-report-nov-9-2026.webp)


*Source: [Arcus, "Arcus Incident Report: November 9, 2026"](https://arcus.xyz/blog/arcus-incident-report-november-9-2026), captured November 17, 2026, used under fair use for educational purposes.*

ArcusGuide is an independent site with no connection to Arcus, dYdX or Robinhood, and nothing here is financial advice. This page sticks to what Arcus and named outlets have published, and says so where they disagree or stay silent.

## What happened

Arcus's report says that at around 10:07 PM ET on November 9, a newly created account "exploited a bug in how the exchange handled transfers between a user's own subaccounts." Under specific conditions, the bug let the account record a balance far larger than it actually held, and the account then requested withdrawals against that inflated balance.

Some context on sub-accounts: Arcus runs its perps on Robinhood Chain, and its [developer docs](https://docs.arcus.xyz/concepts/subaccounts) say one wallet can hold up to 10 of them, each with its own collateral balance, and that funds can move between them inside the same wallet. That internal transfer is where the bug sat.

| Time (ET) | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Nov 9, ~10:07 PM | New account starts exploiting the sub-account transfer bug | Arcus report |
| Nov 9, 10:10 PM | Bridge rate limit caps payouts and holds back $3M of further requests | Arcus report |
| Nov 9, 10:15 PM | Arcus monitoring flags the withdrawals; team starts investigating | Arcus report |
| Nov 9, 11:07 PM | Platform-wide withdrawals paused; status page updated | Arcus report |
| Nov 9, 11:11 PM | Status page incident "Perps withdrawals are paused" opens (04:11 UTC Nov 10) | [status.arcus.xyz](https://status.arcus.xyz) |
| Nov 9, 11:37 PM | Bug fix deployed | Arcus report |
| Nov 9, 11:43 PM | Exploiter's addresses blocked from trading, transferring and withdrawing | Arcus report |
| Nov 10, 4:26 AM | Platform-wide withdrawals re-enabled | Arcus report |
| Nov 10, 5:02 AM | Exploiter's pending withdrawals reversed | Arcus report |
| Nov 10, 12:28 PM | Shortfall covered from the Arcus Labs company treasury | Arcus report |
| Nov 11 | Crypto Times reports an on-chain bounty message attributed to Arcus | [Crypto Times](https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/11/11/robinhood-chain-dex-arcus-loses-2-23m-to-accounting-bug/) |
| Nov 13 | Crypto Briefing reports CertiK's integer-underflow finding | [Crypto Briefing](https://cryptobriefing.com/arcus-integer-underflow-exploit-usdg/) |

The report's summary says Arcus "detected and fixed the bug within one hour." Its own timeline puts monitoring at 10:15 PM and the fix at 11:37 PM, which is 82 minutes. Crypto Times pointed out the same gap, and Arcus has not explained it.

On the cause, Arcus calls it an accounting bug and gives no code-level detail. Crypto Briefing reported on November 13 that the security firm CertiK attributes the incident to an integer underflow, a math error where a number that should go below zero wraps around to a very large positive value, and that CertiK traced nine payouts from the bridge contract. Arcus has not confirmed or disputed that description.

## What Arcus has said about user funds

 Arcus's report makes four statements about money, all in its own words:

- **$2,234,391 USDG** was withdrawn on-chain before withdrawals were stopped.
- **A further $3M** of requested withdrawals was held by the bridge's on-chain rate limit, "never paid out, and later reversed." That $3M is not part of the loss, and Crypto Times also warns against adding the two figures together.
- "No other user balances, positions, or orders were affected," and only a single account was involved.
- "The temporary shortfall has been fully covered by Arcus Labs from the company's treasury."

Arcus also says its security partners reviewed the fix along with related checks across the codebase, and that it is working with blockchain investigators and "will coordinate with law enforcement as appropriate." It published the exploiter's initial address, `0xeFbf442599310E5CeE1A4EDd5c66334c5f30b3Dd`, and asked exchanges and service providers to flag funds received from it.


> **Note:** The treasury top-up means Arcus says it filled the hole on its own books. It does not mean the stolen USDG came back. As of November 17, 2026, Arcus had published no update on recovery, and no outlet we found had independently verified the treasury transfer.


## How to check your own account

Arcus says only one account was involved. If you want to see your own numbers for yourself, these checks read what the interface and the chain show. None of them asks you to move funds.



 If something does not match, contact Arcus through the chat on [help.arcus.xyz](https://help.arcus.xyz) or at support@arcus.xyz, the address its incident report gives for questions. Withdrawals that failed or were slow between 11:07 PM and 4:26 AM ET on November 9 to 10 fall inside the pause window; Arcus's [withdrawal guide](https://help.arcus.xyz/faq/onboarding-faq/withdrawals/how-do-i-withdraw) covers the normal flow.

## What is still unknown

- Whether any of the money comes back. Arcus says the funds are "being tracked on-chain." It has published nothing on recovery since.
- The bounty. Crypto Times reported on November 11 that Defimon Alerts, an automated alert account run by the security firm Decurity, shared an on-chain message described as coming from the Arcus team. Per that report, the message offered the exploiter 10% (about $223,000) to return 90% (about $2.011M) by November 13 at 01:00 UTC. Arcus's incident report does not mention a bounty, and Arcus has not said whether the deadline passed with any return.
- The technical detail. Beyond "accounting bug" in sub-account transfers, Arcus has not published a code-level post-mortem. The integer-underflow description comes from CertiK via Crypto Briefing.
- The one-hour claim. The summary and the timeline disagree by about 22 minutes, as noted above.
- Which code was audited. The published third-party audits of Arcus cover its rootchain contracts. The [What Is Arcus](/ecosystem/what-is-arcus) explainer lists what was reviewed. Arcus has not said which of its partners reviewed this fix.

## How to tell official Arcus updates from scams

Exploits pull in phishers fast. Expect fake "Arcus refund," "compensation claim" and "recovery" pages, plus DMs from people posing as Arcus staff or investigators. Arcus's report announces no claim process, airdrop or compensation form, and it has no token to hand out.

Official places to read updates:

- The Arcus blog at **arcus.xyz/blog**, where the incident report sits.
- The status page at **status.arcus.xyz**.
- Arcus's X account **@arcus_xyz** and its Telegram announcements channel.

Every official web address ends in **arcus.xyz**. Anything with a hyphen, an extra word or a different ending is not Arcus. Our guide to [Arcus scams and fake sites](/privacy/arcus-scams-and-fake-sites) lists the real domains, shows what the fakes look like and covers what to do if you clicked one. Anyone offering to recover funds for a fee is running the second half of the same scam.


> **Warning:** ArcusGuide is an independent guide. It has no access to your Arcus account, your wallet or Arcus's systems, and it cannot freeze, reverse or recover any transaction. For account issues, use the official Help Center at help.arcus.xyz.


For background on the venue itself, [What Is Arcus](/ecosystem/what-is-arcus) covers who builds it and the trust assumptions in its design, [Arcus and dYdX](/ecosystem/arcus-and-dydx) sorts out which company is which, and [What Is Robinhood Chain](/ecosystem/what-is-robinhood-chain) explains the chain and its bridge.




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## Updates

- **November 17, 2026:** Page published. Arcus's status page reads All Systems Operational. Arcus's blog has no follow-up to the November 10 incident report, and Arcus has published nothing on fund recovery or the reported bounty offer.
